

Radicalisation by Stealth: Kosovo Case Study

Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz

When pondering the issues that make life in Kosovo difficult, and making Kosovo difficult for the rest of Europe, one would hardly place terrorism at the top of the list. In Kosovo other problems command attention; state agencies, international organisations and NGOs list international organised crime, corruption and economic crisis as the three most menacing spectres in Kosovo. The EU progress report 2012 states clearly that “to date, terrorism has been a lesser threat in Kosovo than other forms of serious crime”¹ and indeed, incidents of terrorism do not occur to persuade international observers that it poses an insidious danger. One could however wonder whether the international community is able to read the writing on the wall when it comes to the increasing possibility of religiously motivated terrorist activity. By examining the processes of Islamic radicalisation in Kosovo, this paper argues that, although Kosovo has a secularised Muslim population, radicalisation by stealth has already started, out of view of public opinion, and there is an increasing possibility that a terrorism hub will develop in the region. With this aim in mind, the paper first provides a brief overview of Kosovo terrorist organisations, then moves on to discuss the religious element of Albanian identity. In the final part it examines the ways in which radicalisation by stealth has already begun. The main claim is that this phenomenon ought to be monitored carefully as it renders Kosovo vulnerable to infiltration by international terrorist groups.

Terrorism of the Past

The terrorist group most commonly associated with Kosovo is the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), also known as Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK). This military organisation

¹ European Commission, *Commission Communication on a Feasibility Study for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo*, Brussels, 23 October 2012, p. 33.

was active in the region both before and after the conflict and was even nominated by Tim Judah, Balkan correspondent for the Economist, as “one of the most successful military organisations in history” in appreciation of the fact that in spite of fighting no battles it was able to make NATO win its war.² The KLA’s bad name outside Kosovo is due to U.S. special envoy Robert Gelbard, who referred to the KLA as a ‘terrorist group’³ and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In her memoirs, Madeleine Albright recorded a quite ambivalent perception of the KLA: “I sympathised with their opposition to Milošević, understood their desire for independence, and accepted that force was sometimes necessary for a just cause to prevail.” On the other hand she noted that “(...) often indiscriminate in their attacks, they [the KLA] seemed intent on provoking a massive Serb response so that international intervention would be unavoidable.”⁴ The UN Security Council also passed Resolution 1160 which condemned the “acts of terrorism” by the KLA.⁵ And there were reports that the KLA was financed by drug smuggling and that it had ties to Islamic fundamentalists, although a CIA report after the war contested such claims.⁶

The KLA seems to belong to the era which coined the adage that one’s man terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Although the organisation was officially established only in December 1993, its origins lie in a loosely connected network of Marxist-Leninist groups active for years and dedicated to fighting for Kosovo’s independence, and which later converged into one organisation. There are several parallels between the KLA and other groups representing the “old school” national-separatist type of terrorist organisation, such as ETA or the IRA. For instance, all of them maintain a political wing which in the KLA’s case retains a major presence with former commanders as key figures in Kosovo politics. Two of

² T. Judah, *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 75.

³ H. Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, Pluto Press, London, 2000, p. 173.

⁴ M. Albright, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir*, Miramax, New York, 2003, p. 386.

⁵ J. Ker-Lindsay, *Kosovo: Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans*, I.B.Tauris, London, 2009, p. 12.

⁶ I. H. Daalder, M. E. O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly NATO’s War to Save Kosovo*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2000, p. 152.

the most notable are Hashim Thaci, wartime political head of the KLA and the prime minister of Kosovo when it declared independent, and Ramush Haradinaj, who became one of the most important wartime leaders of the KLA in western Kosovo, and was prime minister for about three months before resigning in 2005 to answer charges of war crimes at the UN's Yugoslav war crimes tribunal in The Hague (although the ubiquitous posters in Pristina declare him innocent). More interestingly, if one travels throughout Kosovo today, they will see fresh UÇK graffiti sprayed on the buildings, bridges and walls, signifying that the KLA has not been consigned to the history books, or at least that the books have not been read carefully.

Aside from the KLA in Kosovo there were other minor terrorist organisations such as the Red National Front or the Kosovar Union, and the Albanian National Army, which the UN had branded a terrorist group, and which operated in the western parts of the province.⁷ Additionally, the Movement for an Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia and the People's Movement for a Republic of Kosovo were active throughout Western Europe.⁸ These groups focused mainly on targeted assassinations, and disbanded after the war, or to be more precise, adapted to a new post-conflict milieu by becoming more agents of crime gangs than political struggle. As Wentz observes, the low-level terrorist networks are embedded in the cultures of many ethnic groups in the Balkans, including the clan culture and informal laws and norms of the Kosovo Albanians.⁹ It is acknowledged that the Albanian community in Kosovo is still characterised largely by the *fises* (clans, tribes) and village communities, and that clan culture and informal laws and norms structure the society of Northern and

⁷ J. Ker-Lindsay, *op.cit.*, p. 48.

⁸ M. Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 224.

⁹ L. Wentz (ed.), *Lessons From Kosovo: The KFOR Experience*, CCRP Publication Series, Washington D.C., July 2002, p. 295.

Kosovar Albanians.¹⁰ Consequently, the clan based population of the region served as a reservoir of recruits for fighting organisations during the war, especially for the UÇK. The tightly knit clan-based networks offered aid and shelter to the UÇK, and helped a guerrilla force in the northern mountains of Albania to train and then infiltrate Kosovo.¹¹

To realise that the KLA does not belong to the fourth, religious wave of terrorism as defined by Rapoport,¹² and that Islam does not play a significant factor in the KLA's ideology, it is enough to examine its icon - Adem Jashari. Jashari was a KLA fighter who, surrounded in the village of Prekaz by Serbian soldiers, was subsequently killed along with all the members of his extended family, in 1998. His death was so symbolic that, some claim,¹³ it sparked the 1999 Kosovo War. He became the first hero of Kosovo, and his house became a shrine and a place of pilgrimage. Writing about this phenomenon, Anna di Lellio and Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers noticed however that the Jasharis are in fact called *deshmoret ekombit* (martyrs of the nation), which is not an equivalent of a *shahid* (Islamic martyr of *jihād*), although the family, like the overwhelming majority of Albanians in Kosovo, are Muslim.¹⁴ The secular legacy notwithstanding, certain symptoms of Islamic awakening in the region invite us to investigate the change in the nature of the terrorist threat in Kosovo from the indigenous nationalist-separatist to a religiously motivated international terrorism.

Religion in Albanian Identity

¹⁰ J. S. Sørensen, "Questioning Reconstruction: Reflections on Theoretical Foundations for Conceptualizing Reconstruction in Kosovo," in: F. Bieber, Z. Daskalovski (eds.) *Understanding the War in Kosovo*, Frank Cass, London, 2005, p. 261.

¹¹ H. H. Perritt, Jr., *The Road to Independence in Kosovo. A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 33-35.

¹² D.C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," in: A. Cronin and J. Ludes (eds.), *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2004, pp.46-73.

¹³ Cf.: H. Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, Pluto Press, London, 2000, pp.3-4; I. H. Daalder, M. E. O'Hanlon, *op.cit.*, pp. 27-28.

¹⁴ A. Di Lellio, S. Schwandner-Sievers, "The Legendary Commander: The Construction of an Albanian Master-narrative in Post-war Kosovo," *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 12, no. 3, 2006, p. 518.

When we look at the Balkans, there are in addition to Bosnia other parts with a majority Muslim population. These include Albania, Western Macedonia and Kosovo, where the predominant population is ethnically Albanian. This makes Albanians living in Kosovo only a part of a wider Albanian nation, and although debates abound as to whether they have managed to forge a distinct Kosovar identity as opposed to a wider regional one, these are not a subject for this paper. Even though Albanians profess themselves as very secular people around 80% of them are of Muslim background. Of those, the majority represent Sunni Islam although there are many followers of the Sufi and specifically the liberal Bektashi sect, regarded by orthodox Muslims as heresy. There is also a significant Catholic minority.¹⁵ The weak Islam of Kosovo was partially a result of Yugoslavian communism and partially the offspring of Enver Hoxha's communist dictatorship, which in 1967 declared Albania the world's first atheist state and abolished religion. Another reason why Albanians may have a more relaxed view on religion than other nations, and certainly than other Muslim peoples, is the fact that that Albanian identity is not derived from religious affiliation, as it is elsewhere in the Balkans; religion is not the key to understanding what makes Albanians Albanian, whereas their struggle for independence is. "The religion of Albanians is Albanianism,"¹⁶ I would hear repeatedly during my visits to Kosovo. Those six words from a poem of Pashko Vasa, a 19th-century Catholic writer of the Albanian Renaissance, became a national saying, a slogan implying that something greater than religion brings people together—common ethnicity, language, blood and historical memory. As a late blooming nation, Albanians gladly embraced the idea of a nation beyond religion and as such religion does not play an important role for the Kosovo Albanians in framing their identity; it is rather entirely an ethnic nationalism that comes to the fore. It was according to this logic that, in 1999,

¹⁵ L. Johnston, "Religion in Kosovo and the Balkans—Blessing or a Curse?," in: F. Bieber, Z. Daskalovski (eds.) *Understanding the War in Kosovo*, Frank Cass, London, 2005, p. 184.

¹⁶ T. Judah, *op.cit.*, p. 9.

Muslims of Roma and Slavic background were not spared expulsion and ethnic cleansing but were instead targeted along with the Serbs.¹⁷

In the words of the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, Kosovo “is to Serbs what Jerusalem and the West Bank are to Israelis—a sacred ancestral homeland now inhabited largely by Muslims.”¹⁸ While for Serbs Kosovo is seen as the area in which modern Serbia had its historical foundation¹⁹ containing many important, religious and historic sites such as the seat of the Patriarchate of Peć (now under KFOR surveillance and protection) or the monument of Kosovo Polje commemorating the 1389 battle against the Turks,²⁰ Kosovo Muslims, that is Kosovo Albanians, seem to be largely indifferent towards the issue of religion. “We are Muslims, but we do not practice,”²¹ was something I heard several times during my research in Kosovo by people young and old. Indeed, after staying some time with a Kosovar family I had the feeling that the only religion they adhere to is nationalism, due to the plenitude of Albanian flags and emblems placed everywhere in the house including on its front door, while one would not find a single Koran or anything else indicating that the inhabitants were Muslim.

If then no one calls attention to the threat of Muslim fundamentalism in Kosovo, it is perhaps because Islam in Kosovo is not itself a big issue. In fact, as one of the EULEX²²

¹⁷ L. Johnston, *op.cit.*, p. 185.

¹⁸ Quoted in S. Erlanger, “Clinton Presses Yugoslavs as NATO’s Role Is Hailed,” *New York Times*, 14 October 1998, p. A11.

¹⁹ I. H. Daalder, M. E. O’Hanlon, *op.cit.*, p. 37.

²⁰ L. Johnston, *op.cit.*, p. 184.

²¹ Author’s Research Diary, Kosovo, 17-24 January 2012 and 15-22 January 2013.

²² EULEX, the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo, was established on February 16, 2008, one day before the declaration of independence. Its task is to monitor, mentor and advise on all areas related to the rule of law in Kosovo. Furthermore, it has the right to carry out independent investigations into, and to prosecute, sensitive crimes, such as organised crime, inter-ethnic crime, financial crime, and war crimes.

senior staff told me during an interview,²³ if one is “interested in breeding radicalisation and terrorism hubs in Europe, they should rather look towards Brussels or London, not to Pristina.” It is well known that Muslims from the Balkans have for centuries cultivated a tolerant form of Islam. In everyday life Islam is perceived as a heritage of the Ottoman Empire, seen as a cultural value and never as a hindrance to coexistence. All of the high and middle ranking staff at EULEX and UNMIK who were interviewed²⁴ dismissed any suggestions regarding radicalisation or possible developments regarding religiously motivated terrorism. Interestingly, however, low ranking employees, such as interpreters, drivers and regular police officers, confirmed that radical interpretations of Islam have become popular in Kosovo. Furthermore, the number of people taking religion rather seriously is growing steadily. This is possible because the recent war in Kosovo, as well as the previous conflicts in the Balkans, brought to the surface many challenges related to the stability in the region. One of these challenges is the role of religion, and especially of Islam, in social and political life. In Kosovo, similarly to previous developments in Bosnia albeit to a lesser extent, religious identity was forcefully resurrected during the war. Thus, in spite of the secular tradition in the post-conflict milieu, fundamentalist groups gain support.

It needs to be emphasised that the problem of radicalisation in Kosovo cannot be analysed within the weak/failed state framework. Firstly, one could claim that contemporary Kosovo is not a failed but a post-conflict state, although such an argument is of secondary importance to this paper.²⁵ Secondly, although it is true that Kosovo displays many of the characteristics typical of weak states, such as institutional weakness, unconsolidated

²³ Unless otherwise stated, quotes come from author’s interviews carried out during fieldwork in Kosovo in 2012 and 2013.

²⁴ United Nations Mission in Kosovo administered Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, and since independence still continues its presence there.

²⁵ For detailed discussion of state’s strength in terms of infrastructural and coercive capacity as well as national identity and social cohesion see B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in Post-Cold War Era*, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1991 and K.J. Holsti, *The State, War and the State of War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

democracy, ongoing economical crisis, vulnerability to the influence of international players and other forces, and intense societal divisions, these factors only marginally influence the *nature* of radicalisation processes in Kosovo. In this respect, the social movement theory approach proposed by Quintan Wiktorowicz is more fitting for analysing this phenomenon²⁶ particularly as radicalisation by stealth is not restricted only to developing states but can also be found in mature and stable democracies of Western Europe.

Radicalisation by Stealth

Debates about the role of Islam within the state and society abound in Kosovo. Islam in the Balkans emerges precisely at the crossroads of extremism and moderation, which creates ideal conditions for radicalisation by stealth to flourish. By this term, one should understand the slow and inoffensive radicalisation process, avoiding attracting attention with shocking scenes and waiting for the Islamic movement to gain followers, strength and momentum before it enters the public scene. In this case we can observe a CNN effect *a rebours*²⁷ where the lack of media images from Kosovo help one to conveniently forget about radical Islam in the region. Radicalisation by stealth relies on a simple salami tactics and in many respects it does not differ in Kosovo from the small steps strategy employed by radicals elsewhere.

One of the fiercest debates erupted in Kosovo around the issue of a headscarf ban in elementary and middle schools. Headscarves, known as *ferexhe*, conflict with Kosovo's emergent identity as a secular European democracy, therefore the headscarf ban came into force in 2010 and was based on the Kosovo constitution which defines it as a secular state.

²⁶ Cf. Q. Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004.

²⁷ Cf.: B. Bahador, *The CNN Effect in Action: How the News Media Pushed the West toward War in Kosovo*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007.

Those who visit Pristina regularly undoubtedly notice the increased visibility of young women clad in black veils as well as their growing numbers. In Kosovo wearing *ferexhe* took on a political connotation as a symbol of a more stringent form of religion in public spaces, challenging the traditional model of 'soft' or 'minimalistic' "Islam of the fathers" as is practiced by most Albanians. Demands to allow headscarves to be worn in schools are perceived by many as the beginning of a wider struggle to enforce religion in the public sphere. Those I interviewed told me that the next step will undoubtedly be to push for Islamic classes in the curriculum, covering up females in public, a ban on alcohol, and the introduction of elements of Sharia law to the judicial system. Thus, the *ferexhe* debate can be summarised as a dispute over how to define Islam on a national level, with the dominant group of non-practicing Muslims championing the secular state, versus a fringe but growing number of devout Muslims who seek a political platform. The ban sparked a strong reaction from those who perceived the law as a discriminatory attack on their freedom of religion and right to education. There were protest marches, and several girls stopped going to school in acts of defiance, although in the latter case it is always very difficult to rule out parental influence. My EULEX interlocutor told me somewhat sarcastically that Naim Ternava, serving his second term as Kosovo's highest Islamic authority, threatened to take the issue of the headscarf ban to the European Court of Human Rights even though this is impossible, as Kosovo, with its lack of unanimous recognition, cannot address this court.

In December 2012 radical Islamic groups organised an attack on Kosovo 2.0 magazine, at the launch of the issue devoted to sex and sexuality. In my meeting with Igballe Rogova, founder and director of the Kosovo Women's Network and a declared lesbian, I was shown text messages with threats regarding this event, which were sent to her as one of the organisers. She said that despite a police presence at the event, a group of approximately 20 young men overwhelmed security officers and demolished the venue, destroying the stage,

set and electronic equipment and beating up a male staff member. Then at 10:45 p.m. more than 100 men came to prevent the launch party from happening. Indeed, it was cancelled, and special police forces came to evacuate guests in small groups. The party was dubbed “Night of Sex”, a police officer told me dismissively. Even outside Kosovo it would have sparked controversies, and from the police point of view that was the precise intent of the organisers. Police arrested one person in connection with the attack and my police source told me that the suspect was released after questioning.

As seen from the Kosovo 2.0 incident, the ban has not discouraged the devout, politically active Muslim groups. Even though they failed to “stop publishing depravities”, they succeeded in conveying their message to a wider public. It says that while the state can impose secularism on paper, it cannot prevent people from growing spiritual. With these caveats in mind the formation of the first fundamentalist Muslim political party in the Balkans, the Islamic Movement to Unite, was announced in February 2013. One of its key leaders is Fuad Ramiqi, who won considerable public attention when, in 2011, he began holding Muslim prayer services in the streets of Kosovo’s capital. Ramiqi and his followers demanded the erection of a ‘mega mosque’ to match the Mother Teresa Cathedral, claiming that, while the Catholic minority builds a ‘super church’, the Muslim majority lacks sufficient religious facilities, even though there are more than 20 mosques in Pristina.

During the 1990s the Islamic Community of Kosovo was led by Rexhep Boja, who famously said that “Albanians have been Muslims for more than 500 years and they do not need outsiders [Arabs] to tell them the proper way to practice Islam.” However, his successor, Naim Ternava, gives the impression of a more hesitant person, unable to challenge groups who use Islam for sectarian purposes. In the era of the EU protectorate, endeavours are made not to single out Kosovo or to exaggerate the importance of imported radical imams spreading their message among the brethren. The official narrative insists that “in the wake of

the collapse of communism in Albania and since the war in Kosovo, Arab and Islamic charities and foundations have attempted to proselytise a more intolerant form of Islam among Albanians but, for the most part, they have met with little success.” According to my interview with a EULEX employee “Islamic organisations became active during the chaos than ensued after the war ended in 1999 and came mainly under humanitarian disguise.” NGOs, with funding from places like Saudi Arabia or Qatar, helped to usher in a new wave of Islam with a more fundamentalist posture. They attempted to increase their influence, usually through constructing sacred buildings—mosques and madrasas—or through cultural initiatives such as creating cultural and educational centres which schooled young people according to the Wahhabi doctrine as opposed to the Hanafi one which is predominant in the Balkans.

There was an instant clash between the traditional, tolerant Islam and the new religious missionaries of foreign origin. My interviewees told me that in Pristina there are groups prophesising the victory of a “true religion” and turning the Mother Theresa cathedral into a mosque. Even though, I was always ensured, these are “tiny groupings,” they managed to organise so-called “dorms” for Muslim students which are not controlled or supervised by any of the official organisations. Consequently, no one has any influence on the message spread there and these semi-legal institutions might be very well perceived as foundations of a parallel system being created in the middle of a very secular state.

Although Islamic extremism remains a marginal phenomenon in Kosovo, it is undoubtedly increasing and frequent incidents in recent years show that radicals can pose a threat. In 2009, people whose identities were never discovered beat liberal Muslim theologian Xhabir Hamiti, outspoken critic of radical Islam and the growing influence of foreign Islamic groups. The same year, extremists targeted Ejup Krasniqi, librarian at the faculty of Islamic studies at the University of Pristina, when he was delivering a Friday sermon. The attackers

accused him of not implementing the hadiths of the Prophet Mohammad. Another attack happened in the town of Drenac, where mullah Osman Musliu was beaten for criticising rigid interpretations of Islam imported to Kosovo.

Muslim groups funded from foreign sources and run by overseas clergy are popular among young Muslims in Kosovo wishing to rediscover their religious identity, because the indigenous religious leaders have such little credibility, and certainly so little political power, that they cannot be expected to inspire young people. This is where imported imams can play a trump card. They often claim that, because they come from abroad, they are not tainted and corrupted by the local religious-political establishment. These leaders can use their authority to lead the way to further radical interpretation of Islam. It is enough to mention Xhemajl “Kastriot” Duka, an Albanian born in Macedonia who posed as an imam and operated in Skendraj among Albanians living in the vicinity. His mosque in Marina, built in 1999, was an extremist hub. Duka later moved to Drenica in Kosovo and opened a religious school where all girls were forcefully veiled. In my interview with a family member of one of the schoolgirls attending this establishment I was informed that the local population was so outraged with Duka that around 6,000 residents signed a petition against him. Eventually, having been accused of indoctrinating children, Duka was deported in 2010.

Conclusions

By comparing Kosovo’s “terrorist past” with the changing dynamics of identity framing, this paper sought to delineate how radicalisation by stealth in Kosovo provides the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit. While Kosovo is a long way from becoming a religious theocracy, the emergence of radical groups that spread militant Islam speaks volumes about the dangers of radicalisation by stealth, which can potentially lead to

increased terrorist activity in the region. Islamic radicals seek to incite conflict between different layers of Kosovo identity. Unfortunately, neither the Islamic leaders nor the representatives of the state have always firmly reacted towards religious fundamentalism. It is not an intention of this paper to argue that radicalisation by stealth does inevitably lead to terrorism. Nonetheless, it undoubtedly leaves Kosovo vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups in the future. This observation is especially important when the majority of the analyses regarding terrorism potential in Kosovo fall foul of the “critical mass” fallacy, i.e. they stipulate that, as long as the radicals remain a fringe in Kosovo society, the danger they pose is negligible. It is worth remembering that, in order to act, terrorists do not need support of the masses but merely of a well organised group that can still remain marginal within the wider society.

Kosovo’s counter-radicalisation strategy should consist of short term measures aimed at preventing “scandalising occurrences” such as the Kosovo 2.0 incident or beatings of the clergy, and long term measures directed at eliminating the underlying dynamics of radicalisation. Short term measures should have a disruptive effect on the symptoms of radicalisation, but will not affect the processes and structures that drive radicalisation. Short term counter-radicalisation priorities should focus on several goals. These include preventing the ideologised clashes in public debates; developing communication strategy and cooperation with the religious authorities which will help to distinguish the radical fringe from the vast majority; precluding the radicals from becoming the ‘spokesperson’ for the whole community of Kosovo Muslims; and finally, identifying the leaders (especially foreign imams) and monitoring the organisations, including the Islamic charities, which could be the radicalisation gateways leading Kosovo Muslims to militant interpretations of Islam. The long term measures are meant to address the dynamics that underlie the radicalisation by

stealth and thus they will take more time to bear fruit, but they are crucial in countering religious extremism. Since the radicals seek to disrupt the formation of Kosovo's identity, actions aimed at developing and maintaining societal cohesion, and at creating and strengthening a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society should be the first priority. Such a model of a modern, pluralistic and religiously neutral state will empower a political culture impervious to sectarian divides.

Ultimately, however, one stumbles upon the inevitable "so what?" question. Why does it all matter, why should anyone be interested in this small place with a tiny population, non-existent economy and dependent policies? The answer is terribly Eurocentric: It is enough to look at the map—Kosovo is not at the end of the world, but on the contrary, to follow Judah's wording,²⁸ it constitutes Europe's inner courtyard, and phenomena such as a free trade zone for terrorists, extremist ideologies and radicalisation playgrounds, greenhouses of hatred and brewing violence are undesired. Americans had the option to withdraw from Somalia, a luxury the EU will not have in Kosovo.

²⁸ T. Judah, *op.cit.*, p. XIII.